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<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 48%; border-right: 1px solid black; padding-right: 10px;"> <p>Human Factors is one of the most talked about subjects in aviation. It has created a complete separate component of aviation whether it is in piloting, maintenance, engineering, air traffic control, etc.</p> <p>We are so well informed about “just culture” one wonders why there is so much speculation about the kind of regulatory environment that will provide the safest working environment in every sector of aviation.</p> <p>Much of what is in the Aviation Safety Regulation Review Report’s recommendations and proposals, is the application of human factors that is theorised in human factor guidelines by ICAO, IATA, etc., etc., and have been recommended for years.</p> <p>Whenever ‘distrust’ exists between any level of management then there is a safety concern. For instance, if an airline is having industrial issues with its staff, this is an alarm bell for regulators to monitor safety issues more closely during this period.</p> <p>This will continue until an aviation “just culture” has been re-implemented and safety becomes the main concentration of the airline and its staff.</p> <p>The same applies if the regulator become aware that an operator or organisation is under financial duress, the regulator’s monitoring should be heightened to ensure safety is not affected.</p> <p>Neither the operator or an organisation may realise that safety is being affected because they are concentrating on their “more important” financial issues at the time.</p> <p>If the whole industry, including governments and regulators, adopted human factors as depicted in all the training and transcripts that is orated, then the openness and transparency that is crucial in a “just” culture would have both the regulator and operator/organisation working together to overcome any safety concern or deficiency.</p> <p>Human factors in this industry has had massive research funding and numerous publications have become more important to the non-technical people within this industry than the publications used by technical people flying, maintaining and engineering support. These are the people that practise safety on a day-to-day basis and must be made to feel that they can review perceived safety concerns or deficiencies at any time with management and also the regulator.</p> <p>The regulator must come to understand what is a safety concern and what is a safety deficiency and be mature enough to discuss this with those involved to resolve safety concerns and deficiencies.</p> </div> <div style="width: 48%; padding-left: 10px;"> <p>In a mature aviation industry, the regulator has well trained safety inspectors. Understanding safety and how to improve safety is the first criteria that they must master. To a great degree, a country’s safety record and culture depends on the communication skills of the regulator’s inspectors in correcting a safety concern and deficiency.</p> <p>The Forsyth Report repeats what was included in the Plane Safe Report:</p> <p><i>“The committee was dismayed by the denigration, venom and viciousness of the evidence. This attitude of mistrust if not mutual contempt between the participants places a heavy load on CASA in fulfilling its statutory function of promoting higher safety standards through education, training, advice and consultation”.</i></p> <p>The old DCA also raised similar concerns back in the early 1970s when they identified an ‘atmosphere of reluctance and hostility that would be disastrous in critical situations’. DCA encouraged what would now be identified as a “just” culture, not a ‘no-blame’ culture by breaking down the barriers in the interest of safety.</p> <p>Both ‘Plane Safe’ and ‘DCA’ realised that people make errors and practices may change in a business without any management or staff realising that the practices have changed for the worse.</p> <p>Human factor studies and experience in the aviation industry has, and should be nurtured by the regulators, a high awareness of negating human factor errors developing within a business.</p> <p>A well trained and experienced regulator safety inspector can also identify safety-deficiencies and safety-concerns that may not be obvious to participants when the inspector is performing safety oversight.</p> <p>To be able to communicate the <i>safety-deficiency</i> or <i>safety-concern</i> to an individual or organisation and to educate the individual or organisation so that the chance of repetition will be greatly reduced, is the real achievement of safety inspectors. Reducing the risk of errors by “education, training, advice and consultation”. (Plane Safe)</p> <p>It is time to return to the international safety system where trust, openness and transparency exists between regulator and those regulated.</p> <p>It takes all involved to improve safety and the Forsyth Report has clearly identified how mature effective regulator safety inspectors should carry out their functions and responsibilities.</p> <p>Under “just culture” conditions, individuals are not blamed for ‘honest errors’, but are held accountable for</p> </div> </div>		

MOTTO: SAFETY ALL AROUND

General Aviation Recovery—Post ASRR Report

If the government adopts the ASRR recommendations and proposals, it will take considerable time to rebuild the infrastructure to get private aviation back flying.

The first task to address is pilot training. Prior to the CAA deciding to devolve examiner of airman functions to industry, Australia had a viable pilot training system based on licencing of individual flight instructors.

To get rural Australia back to flying for pleasure and business, there should be no restriction on an independent flight instructor to operate similar to their FAA counterparts.

To ensure safety can be monitored by CASA, an independent flight instructor providing pilot training should be required to have a Commonwealth/State registered business and register with CASA.

Independent flight instructors would be able to provide flight instruction for recreational, private and commercial pilot training as long as their instructor rating covered these ratings.

The regulatory system should not consider the commercial nature of providing flying training but must consider the safety aspects.

This is addressed firstly by promulgating the “standards” that an independent instructor must achieve and retain and secondly by ensuring the independent has the experience, record keeping and administrative controls in place that an approved training organisation provides for their instructors.

To be an experienced independent flight instructor will mean that the reporting system, CASA notifications and other administrative record keeping must be in place.

Independent flight instructors would introduce many more people to aviation simply because of their availability at aerodromes not serviced by larger flying schools.

Rebuilding this infrastructure will take time and would need to be supported by senior instructors.

FAR Part 61, Subpart H, should be adopted including the administrative processes for the operation of a Fixed Based Operator (FBO) providing flight training.

Rural Australia would once again be able to access at least three methods to obtain a pilot licence or rating.

1. Independent flight instructor;
2. FBO employing an independent flight instructor; and
3. CASA approved flying training school.

Increasing the number of CASA ‘student’ and pilot licences is the backbone to resurrecting general aviation.

It is also the career pathway that many will use for employment in the commercial fields instead of being forced to import pilots and/or potential pilots.

If many rural Australians were able to access a cost-effective way to obtain a student pilot licence followed by a recreational or private pilot licence, then general aviation will be able to recover.

This system would also enable specialists instructors for the purpose of agriculture, etc. to operate in a more cost effective situation.

If this is not implemented during the next couple of years then many feel that it will be too late for GA to recover.

Irrespective how you look at recreational aviation, they will come under a lot more pressure over the next few years because their “regulatory” responsibilities will mean higher membership fees.

It is interesting to note that the recreational pilot licence will change GA but others are concerned that type certificated aircraft should be used for the PPL training.

Just how many entrepreneur flight instructors we now have who would venture into the independent field is crucial for GA recovery.

Rebuilding this sector of the industry is crucial for the future growth of aviation. The majority of professional pilots came from rural Australia in the past. This foundation block must be reinstated.

Safety last: Lies and coverups

All members are encouraged to read this article. It is a history of aviation regulating safety in the USA, the way FAA has addressed safety issues and grandfathering.

Safety last: Lies and coverups mask roots of small-plane carnage. [US Today Article Part 1](#). A must read.

“A tragedy in Iowa”

BLAME SHIFTS FROM PILOTS TO HIDDEN DEFECTS, DANGEROUS DESIGNS.

By Thomas Frank, *US Today*

[EXPLORE PART 3](#)

- Learn why older aircraft lack safety gear
- Discover why people die in post-crash fires
- Study the FAA’s “cost-benefit” approach to safety
- Watch a motion graphic describing de-icing problems

[EXPLORE PART 2](#)

- Learn why people die in small-aircraft crashes
- Read about verdicts that contradict NTSB findings
- Examine how the NTSB limits many investigations.

[KEY FINDINGS](#)

- 44,407 have been killed in private plane or helicopter crashes.
- Pilots are blamed 86% of the time.
- Hidden defects linked to small-aircraft crashes over five decades, a USA TODAY investigation shows.
- Learn why people die in small-aircraft crashes.
- Multi-million dollar lawsuits reveal damning evidence.
- Just 15% of small-aircraft crashes are investigated thoroughly.

General Aviation Recovery – Post ASRR

Our page 2 article dealt with building one GA foundation block by bringing back the independent flight instructor, especially to rural Australia. Current flying schools would see growth in commercial pilot training because of the increasing numbers learning to fly.

If the cost of learning to fly is reduced then how can the cost of maintenance be reduced? Reduce red tape?

Maybe adapting parts of the USA and/or Canadian GA systems that would work best in Australia would be the best approach to rebuilding a GA system.

ICAO only states that AMOs service Air Transport operations, aeroplanes and helicopters. Pre 1991 GA AMOs were issued an authorisation from the Authority and they had to comply with the relevant ANO/CAO.

This was seen as one step better than the US system where the GA AMO did not get any approval from the FAA.

The Authority provided free-of-charge all changes in legislation, orders, etc. This can all be done electronically today so why is there a need for a CASA approval?

If the “aviation safety standards” that were specified in ANO/CAOs were resurrected, then could the previous system, or one like the USA system, be safely re-introduced?

Independent LAME & GA AMOs.

For instance, if an aero club engages an independent flight instructor, then the flying club should also be able to engage an independent LAME to maintain their aircraft.

An independent LAME would also need to be an “experienced” LAME with a minimum of 10 years employed as a LAME. An independent LAME could be engaged by other operators.

For example, an ag operator or business aircraft owner, should be able to engage a LAME to maintain their own aircraft. In both these cases, there should be no need for the operator or LAME to have an approved AMO if the “aviation safety standards” were properly promulgated.

The next point is does a pure GA AMO need an approval? If the USA FBO (fixed based operator) system was implemented or the pre 1991 system, then there could be a massive reduction in red tape and costs.

Independent AMOs based on the US FBO system could work in Australia with an education program. It could also include a self notification provision where the FBO registers on-line with CASA. Many options to reduce costs.

CASR Part 145 (harmonised) is needed for Air Transport operations, Class I products (engines/propellers) and export aeronautical products.

A CASR Part AMO should be able to use components from the GA industry as long as the GA “aviation safety standards” meant the LAME would be signing the component to the same maintenance standards.

A product not maintained by the AMO/LAME would not be permitted to be installed in Type Certificated aircraft.

All variations are still ICAO compliant.

How Many Reviews?

Over the last 3 decades, aviation has had a multitude of government and judicial inquiries, review, etc., including internal government inquiries/reviews and very little has been permanently implemented over this period. How many more times will we hear:

“The nature and extent of the changes in CASA’s structure, organisation, operational and corporate processes and general way of doing business have been substantial.”

Even back in 1995, issues raised in the Morris report are still outstanding because Ministers continue to leave it to the CASA Board and DAS to administratively correct.

“This and other management issues such as the skill mix of staff and the relationship between head office and regional and district offices are matters to be addressed by the CASA board and by the director of aviation safety.”

The Morris Report even proposed two options to Sec 3A of the Civil Aviation for the government to adopt.

3A. The main object of this Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation in an effective and economical way, with particular emphasis on preventing aviation accidents and incidents whilst recognising the need for more people to benefit from civil aviation.

Or a more verbose wording supported by industry.

3A. The main object of this Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation, with particular emphasis on preventing accidents and incidents whilst recognising the need for more people to benefit from civil aviation by means that include the follow-

ing:

- (a) the development and maintenance of effective safety regulations;
- (b) the encouragement of greater responsibility for aviation safety by industry;
- (c) the promotion of effective consultation, effective decision-making and the efficient and effective use of resources; and
- (d) the promotion of Australia’s civil aviation safety capabilities.

Post the BASI findings into Monarch Airlines, Minister L. Brereton said:

“I have discussed the strategy with Civil Aviation Authority Chairman, General Peter Gration, who has assured me of the Board’s co-operation in its implementation. The public interest demands firm action in this area.

The Federal Government has decided to establish an Aviation Safety Agency as a separate entity within CAA. The agency will have discrete financial and accounting arrangements and its head, while still reporting to the Chief Executive Officer, will be an executive member of the CAA.

The Government is committed to ensuring that the resources necessary to fill its safety regulatory responsibilities are employed by the CAA to achieve safety surveillance of the industry.

Industry has had to endure the failure by successive CASA Boards/DASs to administratively implement recommendations to eradicate repetitive findings.

If this was an industry operator/organisation, then the regulator would be taking action to close them down. A serious review of the Act must be an outcome from this report.

* Become a Member *

The adage "there is strength in numbers" is absolutely true when it comes to influencing government regulations and policy. No one company, no matter how big or successful, can keep up on all the regulatory issues directly impacting businesses.

AMROBA is dedicated to serving the businesses that are responsible for the in-service continuing airworthiness of aircraft and aeronautical products, including the manufacture of replacement parts for in-service aircraft. This segment of the industry has never had a dedicated advocate until now.

AMROBA membership form is available from the AMROBA website: <http://amroba.org.au/become-a-member/> print the membership form <http://amroba.org.au/index.php/download/file/view/15/>



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Airworthiness Inspectors

ICAO States: *"The satisfactory or unsatisfactory execution of the various airworthiness functions depend to a large extent on the qualifications, experience, competence and dedication of individual inspectors. In addition to the vital importance of technical competency in performing airworthiness inspections and the surveillance of certified operators and approved maintenance organisation, it is likewise critical that inspectors possess a high degree of integrity, be impartial in carrying out their tasks, be tactful, have a good understanding of human nature and possess the ability to get along well with people. Considering the specialised and sensitive nature of the inspector's mission the qualifications, experience and personal characteristics of each person employed to perform inspector's duties will be verified and carefully evaluated before selections are made."*

Before performing an inspector job function, the inspector should have successfully completed a Basic AWI course. So those in industry understand what is in an AWI training, IACO state an AWI should complete Basic and Advanced courses:

Basic course I content.

- Civil aviation rules and regulations;
 - Initial certification of air operators—AOC/AMO issue productions;
 - Introduction to continuing airworthiness;
 - Engineering modification/repair procedures;
 - Facilities and equipment inspection;
 - Maintenance record keeping systems;
 - Ramp inspection of an operator's aircraft;
 - Company (maintenance) manuals;
 - MSG I, II, III maintenance programs.
- Standard Certificates of Airworthiness;
 - Human factors—maintenance;
 - Aircraft leasing (airworthiness matters)
 - Reliability control programs;
 - Weight control procedures.

Advanced course contents

Basic course II contents.

- Aircraft type certification categories explained;
- Type (Acceptance) Certificates;
- Type Certificates for imported aircraft;
- ETOPS operations;
- MMEL/MEL
- General auditing procedures, Parts 1, 2, 3.
- NDT
- Structural Inspection Programs;
- Accident Investigation Course (Field AWIs)
- Aviation Safety Program Course;
- Personnel licencing course.

ICAO states: *"Individuals seeking positions as airworthiness inspectors (maintenance) should have extensive academic and technical education and have progressed through positions of increased technical and supervisory responsibility in the aviation industry or military services. At least 5 years of employment as a fully qualified aircraft maintenance engineer is normally required to obtain minimum qualifications and experience for an individual to adequately accomplish the duties and responsibilities of a basic starting position in the maintenance or avionics field as an airworthiness inspector (maintenance). Moreover, they should possess aeronautical licences, commensurate with their job responsibilities, i.e. LAME mechanical or avionics."*

*"AWIs must have the **personality** to win the respect and confidence of the operator."*

The Aircraft Maintenance Engineers/Technician Creed

Worth Remembering

"UPON MY HONOR I swear that I shall hold in sacred trust the rights and privileges conferred upon me as a qualified aircraft maintenance engineer/technician. Knowing full well that the safety and lives of others are dependent upon my skill and judgment, I shall never knowingly subject others to risks which I would not be willing to assume for myself, or for those dear to me.

IN DISCHARGING this trust, I pledge myself never to undertake work or approve work which I feel to be beyond the limits of my knowledge nor shall I allow any non qualified superior to persuade me to approve aircraft or equipment as airworthy against my better judgment, nor shall I permit my judgment to be influenced by money or other personal gain, nor shall I pass as airworthy aircraft or equipment about which I am in doubt either as a result of direct inspection or uncertainty regarding the ability of others who have worked on it to accomplish their work satisfactorily.

I REALIZE the grave responsibility which is mine as a qualified aircraft maintenance engineer/technician, to exercise my judgment on the airworthiness of aircraft and equipment. I, therefore, pledge unyielding adherence to these precepts for the advancement of aviation and for the dignity of my vocation."